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KOREAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 007: STALEMATE IN
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW - A PROPOSAL
FOR ENFORCEMENT
The Korean Airline Flight incident in September 1983 marked a
turning point in international civil aviation and maritime law. The
incident dramatized the limitations inherent in international law
enforcement and the vulnerability of civilian passengers during in-
ternational travel. Existing enforcement schemes have been useful
but still leave much to be desired. World opinion, deterrence by
armed force, and international tribunals have been the mainstay of
an eroding enforcement equation. Economic motivation seems to
provide the only common thread among a world of diverse ideolo-
gies. Yet piecemeal applications of economic sanctions are rarely
effective and often prohibitively burdensome on the imposing par-
ties. Several new multilateral economic enforcement schemes are
proposed which balance the interest of national security with safe
international travel.
INTRODUCTION
We the Peoples of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow
to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dig-
nity and worth of the human person,. . . and to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained,. . . [and] for these
ends. . . to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another
as good neighbors, . . and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and
the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest, . . . have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish
these aims. . . [and] do hereby establish an international organization to
be known as the United Nations.'
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet military aircraft shot down a ci-
vilian airliner, Korean Air Lines flight 007 (KAL 007), which flew
over Soviet coastal territory while on a scheduled international flight
to Seoul, Korea. 2 Two hundred sixty-nine passengers and crew mem-
1. U.N. CHARTER preamble. The U.N. was established as a consequence of the
United Nations Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco and was
brought into force on October 24, 1945. BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (I.
Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1983). See also Legal Issues in the Shooting Down of KE-007, AIR
& SPACE LAW., Fall 1983, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Legal Issues].
2. U.S. Dep't of St., Press Release No. 327 (Sept. 1, 1983), reprinted in DEP'T
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bers were killed.3
The response of the western world was unanimous in characteriz-
ing this action as unjustifiable and contrary to both the letter and
spirit of prevailing international law.4 Many governments, airline pi-
lot unions, and private citizens imposed sanctions against the Soviet
Union to express their protest.5 Most notably, eleven of sixteen na-
tions with direct air service to the Soviet Union temporarily termi-
nated flights to Moscow."
As evidence uncovering the circumstances of the incident was con-
solidated from several sources and released by the United States
government, the Soviet Union's official posture evolved.7 The Soviet
government's initial response to the incident effectively denied re-
sponsibility for the aircraft's destruction." Later, in the face of un-
controvertible evidence, the Soviets acknowledged responsibility, jus-
tifying their action as legitimate self-defense.9 They also reaffirmed
their defense policy which calls for the use of armed force in the
event of unauthorized overflight of Soviet territory. 10 Yet such use of
force is expressly prohibited by international maritime" and avia-
ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 1, 20, 21. See also ICAO: Action with Regard to Korean Air
Lines Incident, 23 I.L.M. 864-940 (1984) (International Civil Aviation Organization and
U.S.S.R. investigations into the incident).
3. See supra note 2.
4. See generally 38 U.N. SCOR (2740-4, 6 plen. mtgs.); U.N. Docs. S/
P.V.2470-4, 6 (1983). See also U.N. Doc. S/15966/Rev.1 (1983) (Draft Resolution call-
ing for a full investigation of the KAL 007 incident); Korean Airliner Incident, UN
MONTHLY CHRON., Nov. 1983, at 20.
5. In the United States, for example, Ohio, New Hampshire, and other states
banned Russian vodka from liquor stores. In California, longshoremen refused to unload
a Russian freighter despite company threats of fines. In Texas, three anti-Soviet video
games appeared in an arcade. Inquest on a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1983, at 19.
6. 11 Nations Halt Moscow Service to Protest Downing, AVIATION WEEK AND
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 19, 1983, at 26.
7. See generally Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 19-31; DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 1983, at 1-21.
8. In reply to a U.S. demand on September 1, 1983, Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko sent a message to U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz. The message
was an almost verbatim repetition of the TASS (Soviet State news agency) message
issued from Moscow that day, stating that after Soviet fighters attempted to signal and
warn the plane, the airliner continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan. Mr.
Gromyko's message added that in response to a U.S. request, the Soviets began a search
for the aircraft which indicated signs of a possible crash in the area of Morenon Island.
See Dep't of St. Statement of September 1, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct.
1983, at 2 (by spokesperson John Hughes).
9. 38 U.N. SCOR (2472nd plen. mtg.) at _, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.2472, at 6(1983); Soviets Caution West Its Fighters Will Shoot Again, AvIATION WEEK AND
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 19, 1983, at 22; Milde, United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea - Possible Implications for International Air Law, in ANNALS OF AIR
AND SPACE LAW 529, 531 (Matte ed. 1982).
10. See supra note 9.
11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122, arts. 28 & 29 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III].
860
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tion12 law.
In the wake of the incident, the Soviets refused permission for in-
ternational participation in search and rescue operations in Soviet
territorial waters13 and openly interfered with U.S. and Japanese sal-
vage operations conducted in international waters.' 4 This interfer-
ence successfully frustrated the western world's attempt to verify So-
viet allegations that proper internationally recognized intercept
procedures were used and to explain why the airliner strayed off
course into Soviet airspace.' 5
Two international agreements are called into question by this inci-
dent. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS III) regulates the safe and equitable use of the world's oceans
for international navigation and resource exploitation.16 Its aviation
analogue, the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) regulates international air navigation and safety.17 Al-
though UNCLOS III predominantly concerns maritime law, it also
addresses overflight of high seas."8 For example, in the case of
"transit passage"' 9 of aircraft through straits for international navi-
12. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944; 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 3 Bevans 944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as the Chicago
Convention]. Attachment A to Annex II of the Chicago Convention states that "inter-
ception of civil aircraft should be undertaken only as a last resort" and limited to identi-
fying the aircraft and providing navigational guidance. It further states that "intercep-
tion of civil aircraft should refrain from the use of weapons in all cases." Id. Annex II.
The U.S.S.R. became a party to this Convention in 1970. Id.
13. 38 U.N. SCOR (2470th plen. mtg.) at -, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.2470, at 41
(1983). See also Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 20; FAA Administrator
Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL, Oct. 1983, at 19.
14. See Soviet Action Impedes Search for Korean Plane, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1983, at A5, col. 2 (late ed.). See also U.S. Protests to Soviet Over Jet Debris Search,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1983, at A8, col. 1 (late ed.).
15. See U.S. Said to be Closer to "Black Box", N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at
A3, col. 18 (late ed.).
16. UNCLOS III, supra note 11. The United States has not formally ratified
UNCLOS III, due to the U.S. position regarding deep seabed mining. Synopsis, Recent
Developments in the Law of the Sea 1982-1983, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769, 772 n.31,
773 n.49 (1984). However, the United States considers many provisions (those which do
not pertain to the deep seabed) binding as customary law. U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62(PV.192 at 2 (1983) (Statement by Mr. Clingan, U.S. Delegation) See also
Gamble, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of the Sea: Observations, a Frame-
work, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 492-93 (1984). Customary law is
defined as "a general practice accepted as law." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 60
(1963).
17. Chicago Convention, supra note 12.
18. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 39(3)a. See infra note 139.
19. Transit passage of aircraft is addressed in Part III of UNCLOS III. See infra
notes 146-157 and accompanying text. "Transit passage means ... the freedom of navi-
gation, UNCLOS III requires adherence to the Chicago Conven-
tion.20 Likewise, while the Chicago Convention regulates interna-
tional air navigation, 21 it also addresses several traditional maritime
issues, such as search and rescue operations at sea. 22 This overlap
between UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention is more than
coincidence. International aviation and maritime law share a com-
mon heritage and embody fundamental principles of international
law23 which address issues relevant to both. Not surprisingly, both
UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention present common
problems of enforceability.
The KAL 007 incident illustrates many of the still unresolved
problems inherent in international law, particularly the problem of
enforceability. This Comment examines the international law appli-
cable to the KAL 007 incident under UNCLOS III and the Chicago
Convention, the problems of enforceability, and the need for compli-
ance verification through investigatory access. A proposal is
gation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit
[through a] strait between one part of the high sea or an economic exploitation zone(EEZ), and another. . . ." UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 38 (Right of transit pas-
sage). See also, infra note 143 (EEZ defined). Article 39 of UNCLOS III delineates
duties of ships and aircraft during transit passage, similar to the restrictions placed on
ships during innocent passage through a "territorial sea." The doctrine of transit passage
(passage of ships and aircraft through straits), unlike that of innocent passage (passage
of ships through territorial seas) recognizes the right of aircraft overflight. See UNCLOS
III, supra note 11, arts. 34-44 (Straits used for international navigation).
20. Annex C, art. 3 of the Chicago Convention recognizes the right "to fly over a
strip of territory five kilometers wide on each side of the narrow part of the Straits."
Chicago Convention, supra note 12, Annex C, art. 3. The "Chicago Convention" is the
popular name for the Convention of International Civil Aviation. "ICAO" is the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization, the body governing international civil aviation. The
former is the document which serves as the charter for the second. However, they are
often used somewhat interchangeably. Within this Comment, "Chicago Convention" re-
fers to the agreement drafted in Chicago; "ICAO" refers to the governing body. Part II
of the Chicago Convention establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Id. pt. II. ICAO later became affiliated with the United Nations. Cooper, The
Chicago Convention - After Twenty Years, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (1985), reprinted in
J. COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW 440 (Vlasic ed. 1978).
21. See supra note 20.
22. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention addresses investigation of aircraft acci-
dents occurring in the territory of another contracting state. This presumably includes
the airspace overlying the state's territorial seas. See Chicago Convention, supra note 12,
art. 26 (Investigation of accidents). Article 3 of UNCLOS III defines the territorial sea
of a coastal state as that water extending up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles,
measured from the baseline (generally the low-water line) along its coast. See UNCLOS
III, supra note 11, arts. 3 & 5 (definition of "baseline"). Article 23 of the Paris Conven-
tion, the predecessor of the Chicago Convention, specifically addressed aviation incidents
at sea. It stated that "With regard to the salvage of aircraft wrecked at sea, the princi-
ples of maritime law will apply in the absence of any agreement to the contrary." The
Paris Convention of 1919, 3 U.S.T.; Treaties, Conventions, Int'l Acts, Protocols and
Agreements Between the U.S. and other Powers, Dep't of St. Publication, at 3768.
23. V. ROLLO, AVIATION LAW - AN INTRODUCTION 273 (2d ed. 1982). See also
R. FIXEL, THE LAW OF AVIArION 67, 80 (1967). See generally infra notes 89-135 and
accompanying text (tracing the history of maritime and aviation law).
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presented suggesting an expansion of existing economic sanctions to
motivate state compliance with current international civil aviation
and maritime law. 4
THE KAL 007 INCIDENT
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet military fighter aircraft shot down
a civilian Boeing 747 airliner (KAL 007) which flew over Soviet
coastal territory25 while on a scheduled international flight en route
from New York, via Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, Korea. Upon
learning of the disappearance of the aircraft, the United States gov-
ernment slowly accumulated available information from several
sources in an attempt to uncover the circumstances of the incident.2 7
The official posture of the Soviet Union was modified several times
to conform to this information. 8 The Soviet's first response to the
incident denied responsibility for the destruction of the aircraft.29 Al-
most a week later, after the presentation of convincing evidence at
the United Nations by United States Ambassador Kirkpatrick,3" the
24. In international law, "state" generally refers to a country or nation, and the
government thereof.
25. U.S. Dep't of St., Press Release No. 327 (Sept. 1, 1983), reprinted in DEP'T
ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 1. The aircraft was fired upon at 1838 G.M.T. by a Soviet SU-
17 military fighter aircraft. Id.
26. The flight originated at JFK International Airport in New York on August
31, 1983, with an intermediate stopover in Anchorage, Alaska. Kennelly, Korean Air-
lines Flight 007-269 Dead; What are the Rights of the Passengers? - Against Whom?,
AIR & SPACE LAW., Fall 1983, at 1. Two hundred sixty-nine passengers and crew mem-
bers were killed, including nationals from America (47), China (44), Japan (28), Repub-
lic of Phillipines (15), Thailand (6), Australia (4), Sweden (1), India (1), and Canada
(10). U.S. Dep't of St. Press Release No. 327 (Sept. 1, 1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 1983, at 1. 38 U.N. SCOR (2476th plen. mtg.) at _, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.2476,
at 6 (1983). See also Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 20; FAA Administrator
Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 1983, at 17.
27. See generally Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 19-31; DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 1983, at 1-21.
28. See supra note 7. The Soviets seemed to continually modify their position to
correspond to the evidence as it was released.
29. See supra note 8.
30. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's presentation of evidence at the U.N. Security
Council included a transcript of the radio transmission of the Soviet interceptor pilot
reporting to "DEPUTAT," the Soviet ground station controller. It provided, in part:
SOVIET SU-15 (805) AT 1818:34 GMT: "The A.N.O. (Air Navigation Lights)
are burning. The strobe light is flashing."
MIG-23 (163) AT 1818:56 GMT: "Roger, I'm at 7500, course 230."
SU-15 (805) AT 1819:02 GMT: "I'm closing the target."
SU-15 (805) AT 1826:20 GMT: "I have executed the launch."
SU-15 (805) AT 1826:22 GMT: "The target is destroyed."
SU-15 (805) AT 1826.27 GMT: "I am breaking off the attack."
Soviets acknowledged responsibility for the aircraft's destruction
stating that "it was the sovereign right of every State to protect its
borders, in particular its airspace [under] the commonly recognized
principles of international law on which [the] relations of States
rest." 1
Much controversy surrounded the circumstances of the incident.
The aircraft was approximately 300 miles off course, first violating
Soviet airspace by passing over Kamchatka Peninsula, and then a
second time, by passing over Sakhalin Island.32 Both of these areas
support sensitive Soviet military installations. 33 The Soviets alleged
that KAL 007 was on a "premeditated, thoroughly planned intelli-
gence operation" ordered by the United States,3 4 that it was flying
without its navigation lights, that it failed to respond to proper inter-
cept procedures as required by International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) flight rules, and that it maneuvered to evade inter-
ception.35 They later added the allegation that the United States
deliberately staged the incident to provoke a Soviet response calcu-
For a full text of the transcript played at the U.N. Security Council on Sept. 6, 1983,
see, 38 U.N. SCOR (2471st plen. mtg.) at _, U.N. Doc S/P.V.2471, at 6-10 (1983).
The Soviets contended that there were errors in the translation presented to the Security
Council misstating several words spoken by the Soviet pilots. However, these errors did
not change the basic nature or meaning of the translation. See FAA Administrator
Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 1983, at 17. The United States later issued a revised translation changing "I
have enough time" to "They do not see me," and "rockets" to "now I will try rockets,"
and adding a previously unintelligible phrase "I am firing cannon bursts." Dep't of St.
Statement of Sept. 11, 1983 (made available to news correspondents by acting Depart-
ment spokesperson Brian Carleson), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 14.
31. FAA Administrator Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15,
1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 17. See also 38 U.N. SCOR (2472
plen. mtg.) at -, U.N. Doc S/P.V.2472, at 7 (1983).
32. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement to U.S. Dep't of State on Sep-
tember 1, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 8.
33. See Kennelly, supra note 26, at 1.
34. B. Marshal Nikolai v. Ogarkov's statement at a foreign press conference held
in Moscow following the incident. Inquest on a Massacre, supra note 5, at 18. Such use
of a civil aircraft would violate the specific prohibition in article 4 of the Chicago Con-
vention in which contracting states agree "not to use civil aviation for any purpose incon-
sistent with the aims of [the] Convention." Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 4.
However, Soviet use of non-military aircraft and ships for intelligence gathering has been
suspected by the United States. The Aeroflot flight to Dulles Airport on November 8,
1981 was one of numerous incidents. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. The
Soviets have denounced use of civilian aircraft for intelligence gathering in the aftermath
of the KAL 007 incident. The allegations by the Soviet Union that KAL 007 was on a
deliberate spying mission have not been discounted by all nations in the west. Legal
Issues, supra note 1, at 3.
35. See Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement to U.S. Dep't of State on
September 1, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 8. The Soviets also al-
leged that KAL 007's departure was timed to coincide with certain satellite orbital posi-
tions or passages, supporting their "intelligence gathering" allegation. The ICAO investi-
gation, however, discounted any deliberate timing of the departure, beyond insuring an
on-time arrival at 0600 (local time) at Seoul, as was the routine practice of Korean Air
Lines. 23 I.L.M. 894 (1984).
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lated to influence world opinion against the Soviet government.36 Ko-
rea and the United States responded that the use of a civilian air-
liner for intelligence gathering or propaganda purposes was
"unimaginable. '3 7 The United States released recordings of the voice
communications received by Japanese air traffic control from KAL
007 and the radio transmissions of the Soviet intercept fighter pilots,
indicating both that KAL 007's navigation and strobe lights were
reported in sight by a Soviet pilot and that the aircrew of KAL 007
apparently were unaware of the Soviet interception.
3 8
There was speculation that the Soviets had misidentified the KAL
airliner as a United States Air Force RC-135 electronic intelligence
aircraft which had been operating just east of Soviet territory several
hours earlier and may have at one time crossed the flight path of
KAL 007.39 Others explained this Soviet action as a simple condi-
tioned reflex accomplished in accordance with Soviet Border Law
adopted in November, 1982.40
The positions of each side have changed only slightly since the
incident. During the last week of August 1984, after a year-long re-
view, the United States Department of State expressed its opinion
that Soviet Air Defense believed KAL 007 to be a United States
intelligence aircraft when the Soviet fighters fired the air-to-air mis-
36. USUN Press Release No. 70/1, Sept. 6, 1983, Ambassador Kirkpatrick's
Statement, U.N. Security Council, 38 U.N.SCOR (2472nd plen. mtg.) at .- , U.N. Doc.
S/P.V.2472, at 7 (1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 10. See also White
House Press Release, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1199 September 5, 1983, reprinted
in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 7.
37. USUN Press Release No. 70/1, Sept. 6, 1983, Ambassador Kirkpatrick's
Statement, U.N. Security Council, 38 U.N. SCOR (2472nd plen. mtg.) at -. U.N. Doc.
S/P.V.2472, at 7 (1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 10. See also White
House Press Release, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1199 September 5, 1983, reprinted
in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 7. The Shooting of KAL 007, Moscow's Charges and
the Record, U.S. INFORMATION PUBLICATION (1983).
38. See supra note 30 (transcript of the Soviet intercept pilot's radio transmis-
sions); see also infra note 39.
39. See Why the Russians Did It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1983, at 22-23. See also
Legal Issues, supra note 1, at 3. The U.S. later alleged that the closest point of approach
of the two aircraft was 75 nautical miles, and that at the moment of actual interception
of KAL 007, the RC-135 had been at its base in Alaska for more than one hour. FAA
Administrator Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15, 1983, reprinted in
DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 20. In contrast, the Soviets maintained that the RC-135
and KAL 007 flights were both tracked on Soviet radar, and that the radar contacts
merged and remained together for approximately 10 minutes. 38 U.N. SCOR (2471st
plen. mtg.) at , U.N. Doc. S/P.V.2471, at 22 (1983).
40. Soviet Border Law addresses military response among other things, aerial in-
trusion as part of a Soviet defense posture. See generally Why the Russians Did It,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1983, at 24.
siles which destroyed the airliner.41 Earlier that same week, Novosti,
an official Soviet news agency, asserted that KAL 007 deliberately
flew into Soviet airspace while a second South Korean airliner
broadcasted "false radio messages" to confuse air traffic controllers.
It also reasserted the Soviet position that the United States govern-
ment wanted the plane destroyed to enable the United States "to
launch a large-scale propaganda campaign against the U.S.S.R. '42
Search and Rescue Operations
A substantial discrepancy exists between the Soviet accounting of
the KAL 007 incident and the evidence accumulated by the United
States government.43 Retrieval of KAL 007's cockpit voice recorder
and flight data recorder 44 most probably would have provided the
evidence needed to determine whether proper intercept procedures
were used by the Soviets as they alleged, and to explain why the
aircraft strayed off course by 300 miles. An intensive search-and-
rescue effort to salvage these recorders, the remains of passengers,
and aircraft debris, became the new focus of world attention during
the weeks following the crash.45
In accordance with International Standards and Recommended
Practices of ICAO, each party state is called on to "grant any neces-
sary permission for the entry of such aircraft, vessels, personnel or
equipment into its territory and make necessary arrangements...
with a view to expediting such entry" to facilitate search and rescue
operations.46 However, the Soviets refused permission for interna-
41. This was nonetheless characterized as inexcusable error, based on the insuffi-
cient identification of the Boeing 747 and Soviet knowledge of and consent to the com-
mercial international air routes just off its western coast. See SOVIET: U.S. Softens Its
Stand on Soviet Downing of KAL Flight 007, L.A. Times, August 30, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
See also FAA Administrator Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15,
1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 19.
42. SOVIET: U.S. Softens Its Stand on Downing of KAL Flight 007, L.A.
Times, August 30, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
43. See generally Korean Airline Incident, supra note 4, at 19-31; 23 I.L.M. 864-
940 (1984).
44. The cockpit voice recorder onboard KAL 007 was designed to record all con-
versations made over the internal communications system in the cockpit. The flight data
recorder was designed to record flight parameters such as altitude, airspeed, flight instru-
ment presentations in the cockpit, control inputs, control surface positions, and radio
keying. 23 I.L.M. 888 (1984). These recorders are designed to survive aircraft crashes as
an aid to the investigation of aircraft accidents. See Milde, supra note 9, at 495-97.
45. See On the Sea of Japan, 20 Ships Comb for the Wreckage, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 20, 1983, at A10, col. I (late ed.).
46. Article 25 of the Chicago Convention requires contracting states to assist air-
craft in distress, to permit owners of the aircraft or authorities of the state in which the
aircraft is registered to provide assistance, and to cooperate in coordinated measures
when searching for a missing aircraft. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention requires a
contracting state to institute an inquiry into an aircraft accident occurring within its
territory when the accident results in death or serious injury, giving the state in which
the aircraft is registered the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry.
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tional search and rescue participation within their territorial wa-
ters.47 This effectively thwarted the attempt of the Korean and
United States governments to verify the Soviet's claimed adherance
to prescribed ICAO interception procedures and to dispel Soviet al-
legations of intelligence gathering by the Korean aircraft. 48
As the search shifted to international waters, the Soviet, Japanese
and American governments conducted salvage operations focusing on
the flight data recorder. The recorder's homing beacon was detected
"pinging" in the northern Sea of Japan.49 This search brought with
it numerous complaints by the United States against the Soviets for
rules of the road violations. 50 Soviet ships allegedly interfered with
United States search efforts by passing, at top speed, within thirty
yards of United States ships and by deliberately snagging the anchor
line of one search ship.5' Soviet patrol ships also allegedly warned
Chicago Convention, supra note 12, arts. 25 & 26 (Aircraft in distress, Investigation of
Accidents). The Soviets refused to permit international participation in the KAL 007
search and rescue operations, contrary to Chicago Convention requirements. 23 I.L.M.
892 (1984). The Soviets also refused to permit the Korean officials to participate in the
turn over of debris found during search efforts by the Soviets. The wooden boxes of
debris found by the Soviets were handed over to American and Japanese authorities on
Sept. 26, 1983. See Soviets Hand Over Debris From Korean Plane, N.Y. Times, Sept.
Sept. 27, 1983 at A19, col. 1 (late ed.). See also U.S. Protests to Soviet Over Jet Debris
Search, New York Times, Sept. 27, 1983 at A8, col. 1 (late ed.). The Soviets later
justified their refusal to allow international participation by relying on the position of
article 26 of the Chicago Convention, which states "The State in which the accident
occurs will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident in accordance, so
far as its laws permit, with the procedures which may be recommended by the ICAO
. . ." (emphasis added). The Soviets further declare that "No other inquiry is contem-
plated by the provisions of the 1944 Chicago Convention," and then refers to Soviet law,
i.e., 1) The Air Code of the USSR, 2) The State Frontier Law of the USSR, 3) The
Rules of the Air applicable to foreign aircraft in the airspace of the USSR, and 4) Acci-
dent Investigation regulations applicable to civil aircraft of foreign States in the Terri-
tory of the USSR, as establishing the exclusive right of the State Commission for Civil
Aviation Flight Safety in the USSR (Gosavianadzor) to conduct the investigation. Ar-
guably, search and rescue investigatory access, as required by article 25 of the Chicago
Convention, becomes moot when the aircraft's destruction is realized, based on the im-
possibility of any survivors. Any search operation would then be most appropriately char-
acterized as a "salvage" operation which would not fairly be included within the meaning
of article 25. Similarly, the investigatory access required by article 26, if narrowly con-
strued, perhaps also became mooted once the Soviets admitted responsibility for the air-
craft's destruction, thus revealing the cause of the aircraft-crash.
47. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
49. This search covered a fourteen square mile area west of Sakhalin Island in
the northern Sea of Japan. U.S. Said to be Closer to "Black Box", N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1983 at A3, col. 18 (late ed.).
50. See Soviet Action Impedes Search for Korean Plane, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1983 at A5, col. 2 (late ed.).
51. Id.
away ships belonging to Japan's Maritime Safety Agency which had
approached within 650 yards of Soviet ships.52 Soon after, the flight
data recorder's homing signal expired; the search was abandoned,
leaving undiscovered many facts surrounding the incident.53
World Response
The overwhelming response by all countries of the western world
characterized this Soviet action as unjustifiable and contrary to pre-
vailing international law." Demands made by the Korean govern-
ment to the Soviet Union via the United Nations included a full and
detailed accounting of the circumstances of the incident, a full apol-
ogy and complete compensation for the loss of lives and the aircraft,
and punishment of those Soviet individuals responsible. The Koreans
further demanded a guarantee of unimpeded access to the crash site
to representatives of impartial international organizations such as
the ICAO and return of any remains or debris that might be found,
and specific, concrete, effective, and credible guarantees against a
recurrence of such actions against unarmed civilian airplanes any-
where in the world.55 Similar demands were made by the United
States via the U.S. Department of State.56 Both the Korean and
United States governments presented formal notes through United
States diplomatic channels to Soviet Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM) Sokolov on September 12, 1983, demanding monetary com-
pensation. Soviet DCM Sokolov, however, refused receipt of these
52. Id. Arguably, as property belonging to Korean Airlines, an exclusive right to
salvage the recorders arguably belongs to the company or to the Korean government, or
their designated agents. Once these recorders were discovered submerged in international
waters, this exclusive Korean right to salvage them seems to overshadow the duty im-
posed upon the Soviets under the Chicago Convention to conduct an investigation of an
aviation accident occurring within their territory. See Chicago Convention, supra note
12, art. 26. The salvage operations of the Japanese and U.S. governments, as invited
representatives of the Korean government, is evidence of an intent to preempt the Soviet
search effort. See Dep't St. Press Release No. 327, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct.
1983, at I (Sept. 1, 1983). Soviet interference with U.S. and Japanese search and sal-
vage efforts appears to have been designed to prevent retrieval of the recorders by the
United States or Japan, thus precluding the direct evidence needed to contradict the
Soviet version of the circumstances of the incident.
53. See Hopes Dim for Finding Jet's Flight Recorders, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983
at A7, col. 5 (late ed.).
54. See Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 20-31. See also 38 U.N.
SCOR (2470-4, 6 plen. mtgs.), U.N. Doc S/P.V.2470-4, 6 (1983).
55. See Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 21. See also 38 U.N. SCOR
(2470th plen. mtg.) at , U.N. Doe. S/P.V.2470, at 11 (1983).
56. Statement by Acting U.S. Dep't of State spokesperson Allen Romberg at a
press conference held on Sept. 12, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 14.
See Why the Russians Did It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1983, at 23; Legal Issues, supra
note I, at 23.
57. Acting Secretary Eagleburger's Statement, Sept. 6, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T
ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 14.
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notes.58 Most other western and third world nations similarly de-
nounced the Soviet action and called for a full accounting and apol-
ogy from the Soviets. 9
The United Nations Security Council met at the request of the
United States,60 the Republic of Korea,"" and Japan 62 to debate and
ratify a resolution denouncing the destruction of the Korean airliner
and declaring the use of armed force against international civil avia-
tion as incompatible with the norms governing international behav-
ior.63 After lengthy debate, the resolution was vetoed in the Security
Council by the Soviet Union. 4
Actions taken by the United States government included sus-
pending the Soviet airline Aeroflot's right to sell air transportation in
the United States and prohibiting airlines registered in the United
States from selling or honoring Aeroflot tickets or tickets for trips
which included connections with Aeroflot flights.6 5 The United
States Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) estimated that these sanc-
tions cost the Soviet airline $1.5 to 2 million annually in United
States currency. 6 In response to a call by the International Federa-
tion of Air Line Pilot Associations (IFALPA), eleven of sixteen na-
tions with direct air service to Moscow halted their Moscow flights.6 7
58. Id.
59. 38 U.N. SCOR (2470-4, 6 plen. mtgs.), U.N. Doe. S/P.V. 2470-4, 6 (1983).
See Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 20-31.
60. U.N. Doe. S/15947 (1983).
61. U.N. Doe. S/15948 (1983).
62. U.N. Doe. S/15950 (1983).
63. See Korean Airliner Incident, supra note 4, at 20-31.
64. The vote on the draft resolution was nine in favor (France, Jordan, Malta,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Togo, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire) to two against (Po-
land, U.S.S.R.) with four abstentions (China, Guyana, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe). The pro-
visional draft, having passed by a majority vote in the Security Council, was defeated
when the U.S.S.R. exercised its veto privilege. See Korean Airliner Incident, supra note
4, at 19-20.
65. White House Statement (Sept. 8, 1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct.
1983, at 13. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. at 1211.
66. U.S. Actions estimated to cost Soviets $1.5-2 Million Annually, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 19, 1983, at 18.
67. Inquest on a Massacre, supra note 5, at 19. Nations temporarily terminating
their Moscow air service included Britain, France, West Germany, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Italy and Japan. Eleven Na-
tions Halt Moscow Service to Protest Downing, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept.
19, 1983, at 26. The International Federation of Air Line Pilot Associations (IFALPA)
called for a 60-day suspension of Moscow service by member organizations. Inquest on a
Massacre, supra note 5, at 19. NATO Countries fail to take joint action against Soviets,
Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1983, at A14, col. 1. The President of the United States pro-
claimed Sunday, September 11, 1983, a national day of mourning. During the previous
week, flags were flown at half staff at Federal installations and U.S. Military bases
These sanctions, however, primarily economic in nature, served only
as token expressions of western world opinion. Despite one of the
strongest world reactions ever to a single use of force, the Soviets, as
yet, have announced no change in their position.
Previous Incidents
International law is generally founded in custom.68 Much of this
custom is eventually codified in the form of treaties, agreements, and
protocols.6 9 State ratification of such codified international practices
fortifies the expectations upon which nations rely to anticipate the
behavior of other nations and on which nations depend to justify
their own actions. Numerous international incidents have laid the
foundation for such international precedent.
Perhaps the most significant example of Soviet reliance and invo-
cation of international maritime law is that of the Soviet submarine
intrusion into Swedish waters in 1981. A Soviet submarine ran
aground inside a restricted security zone nine miles southeast of the
Karlskrona Naval Base, deep within Swedish territorial waters.70
The Swedish government ultimately concluded "that the submarine
had intentionally violated Swedish territory to gather intelligence. ' 7 1
Intelligence gathering activity and submerged transit within the ter-
ritorial waters of another state are activities expressly prohibited
under UNCLOS 111.72
Responding to Swedish government protests regarding the subma-
rine incident, the Soviet government stated:
It was expected, of course, that authorities would abide by existing interna-
tional norms under which if a foreign warship does not even (sic) observe
the rules of a coastal State regarding passage through its territorial waters,
the only thing the coastal State may do with respect to the given warship is
to demand that it leave its territorial waters.7 3
around the world. President's Statement, Sept. 1, 1983, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1191. See also DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 3.
68. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 269.
69. Id.
70. This incident occurred on the night of Oct. 27, 1981. Uncharted Waters: Non-
innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 625, 626,
n.2. During the following 11 days, another submarine periscope was sighted in Swedish
territorial waters, and a Soviet salvage vessel was ordered to depart after entering Swed-
ish territorial waters. Id. at 627, n.11 (1984).
71. Id. at 627, n.1l (1984).
72. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 20. Article 20 of UNCLOS III requires
submarines navigating in the territorial sea to remain on the surface and display their
flag. This incident was the culmination of many earlier incidents detecting unidentified
submerged submarine transits through Swedish territorial waters. Froman, supra note
70, at 627, n.l 1 (1984).
73. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Statement, U.N. Security Council, Sept. 12, 1983;
38 U.N. SCOR (2471st plen. mtg.) at .. , U.N. Doc S/P.V.2471 (1983); reprinted in
DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 16 (quoting the soviet response).
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The Soviet Union alleged that the submarine's "unintentional" en-
trance into the territorial waters of Sweden was caused by a failure
of its navigational equipment and poor weather conditions which re-
sulted in inaccurate position marking. 74 Interestingly, navigation er-
ror was the probable cause of KAL 007's 300 mile deviation from
"Red-20," the airway designated for its intended route of flight.75
This violation of international maritime law by the Soviets is not
an isolated incident. For example, in March 1984 a Soviet subma-
rine collided with the United States aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in
the Sea of Japan while "shadowing" a United States task group.
Such action violates international maritime law which is designed to
enhance safety at sea.
Nor was the KAL 007 incident the first instance of Soviet action
against a civil airliner. In 1978, a Soviet MIG aircraft fired a missile
at a Korean airliner which strayed into Soviet airspace, shearing off
fifteen feet of the aircraft's wing.78 In the incident, testimony given
by the Korean pilot indicated that the aircraft was tracked by the
Soviets for several hours, and then fired upon without warning. 9
This accounting contradicted Soviet allegations at the time that "fair
warning" was given to the aircraft using internationally recognized
74. Id.
75. See What are the Rights of the Passengers? - Against Whom?, AIR & SPACE
LAW., Fall 1983, at 14, 15. See infra note 154 (discussion of international air route
"Red-20).
76. See Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 18, 1984, at 16, col.1 (late ed.). See also
N.Y. Times, March 22, 1984, at A6, col.3 (late ed.). Wash. Post, March 23, 1983, at
A18, col.l.
77. See, e.g., Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High
Seas (May 25, 1972); 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. No. 7379, 852 U.N.T.S. 151, Protocol to
the Agreement of May 25, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7379 On the Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the High Seas (May 22, 1972); 24 U.S.T. 1063, T.I.A.S. No. 7624. See also
UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 146, entitled "Protection of Human Life," which
states: "With respect to activities in the Area, necessary measures shall be taken to en-
sure effective protection of human life . . . ."; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982). So-
viet submarines following U.S. carrier battlegroups are suspected of undetected "shadow-
ing" by submerged navigation directly beneath the aircraft carrier where the noise
generated by the carrier masks detection of the noise generated by the submarine. Sound
propogation is one of several methods of submarine detection, identification, and
tracking.
78. See N. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW (1981) at 175, n.202.
See also Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Statement, U.N. Security Council, September 6,
1983 (USUN Press Release No. 70/1), 38 U.N. SCOR (2471st plen. mtg.) at -, U.N.
Doc. S/P.V.2471 (1983), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL, Oct. 1983, at 8. The aircraft was
forced to make an emergency landing on a frozen lake 400 miles from Leningrad result-
ing in the death of two passengers. Id.
79. See Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement, supra note 78 (discussion of the
testimony of the pilot, Kim Chang Kyu, to the N.Y. Times) and accompanying text.
ICAO procedures.80
The use of arms in cases of interception of civil aircraft was con-
demned by Leonid Brezhnev, former President of the Soviet Union,
after a Soviet aircraft on which he was traveling was intercepted en
route to Morocco." Mr. Brezhnev's aircraft was warned by radio,
and then, absent a response, by warning shots. The plane was forced
to leave the sixty kilometer Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
designated by France during the Franco-Algerian War. 2 In his pro-
test Mr. Brenzhev argued that France lacked power under its state
sovereignty to regulate, intercept, or open fire upon flights above the
high seas. 83 The French-Soviet incident, however, is distinguishable
from the KAL 007 incident. The former occurred over the high
seas;84 the KAL 007 incident occurred in territorial airspace subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of a coastal state.8 5
Another recent aerial incident involved a Soviet airline Aeroflot
flight to Dulles Airport in Washington, D.C., on November 8, 1981.
The Aeroflot airliner entered United States airspace at an unautho-
rized point in New England, flying over New England land area,
although its clearly demarcated route was almost exclusively over
open waters. 86 It continued over Pease Air Force Base and the Naval
Facility at Groton, Connecticut. 7 On the aircraft's return flight sev-
eral days later, it flew the identical unauthorized route.88
80. Id.
81. See N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 176, n.203.
82. Id. Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) are common today. The United
States has established an ADIZ which extends seaward approximately 50-250 nautical
miles from U.S. coast lines. Aircraft maneuvering within or transmitting through this
ADIZ are required to file flight plans which facilitate their identification. Unidentified or
unauthorized flights within this zone are subject to military aircraft interception for iden-
tification and escort out of the zone.
83. See N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 176, n.203.
84. In this context, "high seas" refers to the waters extending beyond a coastal
state's territorial sea. Article 3 of UNCLOS III establishes the outer limit of a state's
territorial sea at 12 nautical miles from the normal baseline (low water line). Most states
assert a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, although several assert a lesser limit. For pur-
poses of executing art. 86 of UNCLOS III, which recognizes freedom of the high seas
for navigation and overflight, this 12 mile maximum limit establishes the boundary of the
"high seas." See UNCLOS III, supra note 11, arts. 3 & 86.
85. UNCLOS III, supra note 11. Chicago Convention, supra note 12. It is note-
worthy that KAL 007 was shot down while retreating from Soviet airspace, within ap-
proximately one minute of re-entering international airspace. Id.
86. Ambassador Lichenstein's Statement, U.N. Security Council, Sept. 2, 1983
(USUN Press Release 68), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 3.
87. Id.
88. Id. The U.S. responded to this violation of its airspace by filing a note of
protest via diplomatic channels. Id. The U.S., however, cannot claim clean hands. For
example, on May 1, 1960, American intelligence-gathering overflights of the Soviet
Union resulted in the shooting down of a military reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Gary
Francis Powers. The aircraft was forced to land in Soviet territory. See N. MATrE, supra
note 78, at 175, n.199. See also 5 Whiteman's Digest 714-15 (1973) (U-2 Incident). But
see 5 Whiteman's Digest 810-12 (1973) (RB-47 incident, 1960). See generally Lissitzyn,
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The Soviet's selective adherence to international law not only ap-
pears self-serving but has created extremely inconsistent precedent.
Such inconsistency breeds insecurity in the international forum, un-
dermining the viability of international law.
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW
Historical Development of International Aviation Law
The legal regime which addresses the use of "airspace" above the
high seas is analogous to the legal regime of the high seas itself
under maritime law.8 9 Each evolves from the same heritage of mari-
time law 90 and applies common principles.91 Unarguably, aircraft
and ships serve the same general purposes; they function as transpor-
tation vehicles for goods and people, providing a vital link between
the nations of the world. They also serve as platforms for reconnais-
sance and weapon delivery, calculated to protect individual states'
interests, including self-preservation. Both carry out these functions
in international territory, i.e., the high seas and the airspace above
it,92 and both raise the issues of freedom of navigation and sovereign
authority. Further, the evolution of maritime and aviation interna-
tional law underscores their common nature.
The concept of international law evolved in the sixteenth century
in Europe in the midst of developing nationalism. 93 Courts were es-
tablished by many coastal states to resolve maritime disputes.94 Na-
tional control of coastal waters usually extended to three miles, the
approximate limit of defendable coastal waters,9 5 although some
states asserted sovereignty over entire seas.9 Within this setting,
Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608) was among the first to recognize the
The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law, 47 AM. J.
OF INT'L LAW 559 (1953).
89. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 274.
90. Id. at 274-78.
91. Id. at 274.
92. See supra note 84.
93. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 272.
94. Id.
95. The boundary was set in accordance with the distance that cannon fire was
able to afford protection to the coast land. N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 73. "The State
that wishes to reign over the liquid plain, Without might, will have power in vain, And
the bullet launched from the cannon tower, Marks the limit of sovereign power." Id. at
n.1 (translation by N. MATTE). The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries established the
principle of freedom of the high seas. States then began to recognize three mile territo-
rial seas.
96. Id.
universal principle that the high seas should be open to the ships of
all nations."'
Gentilis' work was eventually overshadowed by that of Hugo Gro-
tius (1583-1645).98 Grotius was motivated by his observations of the
inhuman and cruel practices of nations at war. 9 He advocated re-
forms based on reason and justice, to achieve a higher degree of hu-
manity during times of international conflict.100 He, like Gentilis, as-
serted the concept of freedom of the sea' 01 and air for all nations as
the common property of all mankind.102
Aviation began to develop in the late nineteenth century. 10 3 Be-
cause aircraft could easily enter, overfly, and depart a foreign state,
aviation brought with it new threats to the concepts of guarded
boundaries, fortified centers of population, and national sovereignty
over airspace. 04 These were problems formerly not encountered with
ships. The traditional concept of the common heritage of man which
supported common rights to the use of the air and high seas took on
new meaning.'05 While aviation brought with it uniquely valuable
potential, it also posed unique risks to national security. 06 As a re-
sult, aviation became the subject of numerous treaties, no less impor-
tant than the maritime treaties which regulated ships at sea.
The end of the nineteenth century saw the use of aerial craft as
vehicles of war; this drew serious international attention.107 During
the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), balloons were employed to
carry newspapers and mail out of Paris while the city was sur-
rounded by Russian forces.' 08 The Hague Conference of 1899 pro-
hibited the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons.10 9
97. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 273. Gentilis was born in Italy and eventually
moved to England. Id. He is also given credit for proposing rules to be used in drafting
peace treaties, which he analogized to contracts. Id.
98. Id. Grotius' the DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS was published in 1626, becoming
the standard reference on international law for 300 years. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also, Froman, supra note 70, at 625, 631 and n.23.
101. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 273. Grotius took a position against the theory of
mare clausum, and his work, DE JuRE PRAEDE (in Chapter XII entitled "mare
liberum") had a decisive effect on the preservation of this principle (mare clausum, "the
closed sea" conceptually opposed the former contention that a nation could in some cases
claim jurisdiction over certain parts of the open ocean even beyond the immediate vicin-
ity of its coast). 2 BOUVIER's LAw DICTIONARY, 311 (1897). See also, N. MATTE, supra
note 78, at 78-79.
102. Id.
103. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 275.
104. In the earliest stages of aviation development, overflight of foreign states was
accomplished by the use of balloons and dirigibles. Id. at 275.
105. See N. MATTE, supra note 78, 78-79.
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The Second Hague Conference in 1907 again denounced the use of
aircraft in times of war between contracting States. 1 0 However, few
major powers ratified these agreements, primarily because of their
technological superiority in aircraft development and a desire to use
aircraft to their own military advantage." 1
By 1914, with the outbreak of World War I in Europe, sophisti-
cated dirigibles and primitive fixed-wing aircraft were used to locate
and plot troop movement and to drop bombs on a limited basis.11 2
Aviators were ordered to limit bombing to strategic military targets,
although lack of precision resulted in many civilian casualities.113
Because planes could cross national boundaries and were nearly
impossible to stop, new legal questions arose regarding accidental
penetrations, innocent passage, and intentional intrusion.,, 4 In the
western hemisphere, the 1916 meeting of the Pan American Aero-
nautic Federation (PAAF), in Santiago, Chile, recognized national
sovereignty and control of the airspace overlying each state's terri-
tory. However, aircraft of states in the Americas had already en-
joyed reciprocal overflight rights.1 "5 There were no formal accept-
ances of the PAAF, but a foundation of theory for the Americas had
been achieved.1 1 6
The Paris Convention was adopted in 1919,117 amidst these at-
tempts to develop a body of international aviation law. 1 " It ruled
civil air commerce in Europe for the next twenty years. 1 9 The Paris
Convention recognized national sovereignty over the airspace above a
state's land and water territory. 120 The Convention also regulated bi-
lateral innocent passage rights, required aircraft airworthiness certif-
110. Id. at 284. See also, R. FIXEL, supra note 23, at 27; The Hague Peace Con-
ferences of 1899 and 1907, 2 ScoTT DOCUMENTS 152, 154 (1899) (Proceedings of the
Hague Tribunal).
111. 2 SCOTT DOCUMENTS 152, 154 (1899). See also, V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at
284.
112. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 285.
113. Id.
114. Id. Intentional intrusion, in this case, refers to aerial reconnaisance and
attack.
115. Id. See also, R. FIXEL, supra note 23, at 31.
116. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 285; R. FiXEL, supra note 23, at 31.
117. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 286. See generally N. MATTE, supra note 78, at
103-118.
118. The formal name of the Paris Convention was the International Convention
for the Regulation of Air Navigation; 3 U.S.T.; Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States and other Powers, Dep't of
St. Publication, at 3768; R. FIXEL, supra note 23, at 32.
119. FIXEL, supra note 23, at 32.
120. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 286.
icates and crew certification, recognized the rights of nations to favor
their own aircraft in domestic air transport (cabotage rights), and
provided for the deposit of security funds to substitute for aircraft
seizure under patent infringement claims.121 However, the Conven-
tion did not deal with military use of aircraft.
To regulate this still unaddressed area of international aviation, a
group of European jurists gathered at The Hague in 1922 to draft
The Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923),122 which gave neutral na-
tions the right to (1) refuse the aircraft of warring nations admit-
tance to the neutral's airspace, (2) allow use of force to protect such
airspace penetration, (3) permit movement of goods, including air-
craft, through its jurisdiction at will, and (4) seize the aircraft and
crewmembers of warring nations violating their sovereign air-
space. 1 23 The participating nations, however, failed to ratify The
Hague Rules of Warfare, although a number of nations announced
that they would voluntarily abide by the rules, no doubt hoping for
reciprocal adherence by other nations.1 24
Meanwhile, the Madrid Convention held in 1926 laid the frame-
work for the Havana Convention of 1931. The Havana Convention
developed a uniform international agreement for civil aviation in the
Americas. The agreement was similar to the Paris Convention, its
European counterpart.12 5 The Havana and Paris Conventions pre-
vailed in their respective hemispheres until they were replaced in
1944 by the Chicago Convention. 26
The Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Jurisdiques Aerins
(CITEJA) was formed in 1925 to address areas of private aviation
law not yet considered in earlier international conventions.127
CITEJA conducted several important conferences, including the
Warsaw Convention of 1929 on the air carriage of property and per-
sons, 1 28 Conventions regarding damage by aircraft to persons or
121. Id.
122. Id. at 287. N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 93-95.
123. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 287, 288.
124. Id. at 288.
125. The Havana Convention. Id. at 289. See generally N. MATTE, supra note 78,
at 199-222.
126. Both the Paris and Havana Conventions were superceded by the Chicago
Convention of 1944. Article 80 of the Chicago Convention specifically states that "Each
contracting State undertakes, immediately upon the coming into force of this Conven-
tion, to give notice of denunciation of the [Paris Convention or Havana Convention]. As
between contracting States, the Chicago Convention supercedes the Conventions of Paris
and Havana." Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 80.
127. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 288.
128. Id. Warsaw Convention, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. The Second International Diplomatic Conference on
Private Air Law, later to be known as the "Warsaw Convention," met in Poland in 1929.
See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 292. It satisfied an important need in international civil
aviation law by establishing criteria to compensate air customers for the loss of air cargo
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property on the ground,1 29 and the Convention on the Salvage of
Aircraft at Sea. 30 The work of CITEJA in Paris during 1936 laid
the legal foundation for all future international air law. 131 This work
was continued by the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization (PICAO), established in 1944.132 The Chicago Convention
convened on November 1, 1944, at the invitation of the United
States government.133 It was motivated by post-World War II senti-
ment against the use of aircraft as vehicles of destruction, and by the
problems of enforcing the "absolute sovereignty" principle of the
Paris Convention. The "final act" of this conference produced the
text of a "Convention," three "Agreements," twelve technical "An-
nexes," and formally established the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO).
Today, Chicago Convention serves as the international agreement
regulating international civil aviation, administered by ICAO."" Its
maritime analogue, UNCLOS III, and is administered by the
or baggage. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 292. The Warsaw Convention standardized
waybills, claim checks, and ticket documentation, and established liability limits for air-
line passenger injury or loss of life. See V. ROLLO, supra note 20, at 292. The Warsaw
Convention continues to exist today, independent of other international aviation law, reg-
ulating this narrow area of international civil aviation. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan 1, 1984,
at 207. See Warsaw Convention, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. However, it has undergone revision since 1929, most notably
by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, which increased airline liability to $75,000 in cases
where tickets are sold in the United States, or when a scheduled point of departure, stop,
or arrival is in the United States. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 292. This modifica-
tion, drafted by the United States, enabled the U.S. to continue ratification of the War-
saw Convention.
129. The Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952 provide for reimbursing third par-
ties on the ground or water in cases of personal injury or property damage caused by civil
aircraft operation. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Damages
caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Rome, May 29, 1933, Hudson, 6 Int.
Leg. 334. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 294, 295.
130. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Assistance and
Salvage of Aircraft or by Aircraft at Sea, Brussels, Sept. 29, 1933, Hudson, 8 Int. Leg.
135. Not in force.
131. See V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 289.
132. Id. at 295.
133. Id. at 296, 297. On Nov. 1, 1944, in response to a British initiative, President
Roosevelt invited all the allied powers as well as some neutral governments to convene at
Chicago for a conference in civil aviation. DIEDERIKS - VERSCHOOR: AN INTRODUCTION
TO AIR LAW at 9 (1982). On Dec. 7, 1944, some fifty states signed the Chicago Conven-
tion with the two agreements annexed to it, i.e., the International Air Services Transit
Agreement, 59 Stat. 1693, EAS 487, 3 Bevans 916, 84 U.N.T.S. 389 (Two Freedoms
Agreement) and the International Air Transport Agreement, 59 Stat. 1701, EAS 488, 3
Bevans 922 (Five Freedoms Agreement). Id. at 10. Fifty three states attended this con-
ference. Id.
134. TREATIES IN FORCE (Dept. St. Pub. No. 9351, Jan. 1, 1984).
United States. 135
Modern International Aviation Law
The drafters of both the Chicago Convention and UNCLOS III
justified these treaties as necessary instruments to achieve interna-
tional peace, safety, and mutual benefits. The Chicago Convention
solicits cooperation among nations for universal peace and the devel-
opment of international civil aviation in order to "promote sound and
economic regulations."1 3 Likewise, UNCLOS III solicits mutual
understanding and cooperation by states in the use of the sea,
thereby reaffirming the goals of peace, justice, security, friendly rela-
tions, and progress for all peoples of the world. 13 7 Like most treaties,
UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention are mutually beneficial
to contracting states by the exchange of privileges.138
UNCLOS III, although a maritime treaty, inherently affects in-
ternational civil aviation in many ways. Both UNCLOS III and the
Chicago Convention expound common principles historically shared
by maritime and aviation law. Each sets forth provisions regulating
the use and control of airspace overlying international waters consis-
tent with their charters of peace and cooperation.'3 9 This overlap be-
tween UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention gives rise to com-
mon issues.
135, Chicago Convention, supra note 12.
136. Id. at Preamble. See also N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 131 e1981).
137. UNCLOS II, supra note 11.
138. International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of
law binding upon States, therefore, emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and estab-
lished in order to regulate the relations between those co-existing independent communi-
ties or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.10, at 18. 2 Hudson,
WORLD COURT REPORTS 35 (1935).
139. An analysis of the text of UNCLOS III reveals its relevance to the Chicago
Convention, its Annexes, and international civil aviation in general:
UNCLOS III subjects - articles which affect the Chicago Convention
a) Airspace over territorial seas - art. 2.
b) Airspace above waters forming straits used for international navigation - arts.
34, 38 & 39.
c) Airspace over archipelagic waters - arts. 2, 49, 53 & 54.
d) Overflight over the EEZ - art. 58.
e) Airspace above the continental shelf - art. 78.
f) Freedom of the High Seas - art. 87.
g) Regime of islands - art. 121.
h) Right of transit for land-locked States - arts. 124 & 125.
i) Airspace superadjacent to the Area - art. 135.
j) Pollution from or through the atmosphere - arts. 194, 212 & 222.
k) Pollution by dumping - arts. 1, 194, 210 & 216.
I) Sovereign immunity of aircraft owned or operated by a State and used on
government non-commercial service - art. 236.
Milde, supra note 44, at 529, 531.
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The ocean is generally subdivided into areas to delineate various
rights of states to its use, and which allocate jurisdictional control
over this use. The predominant subdivisions include the internal wa-
ters,140 the territorial sea,14 1 the contiguous zone,142 the economic ex-
ploitation zone (EEZ), 4 I and the high seas.4 In defining rights to
airspace above the ocean, the terms "territory" and "high seas" are
used in both the Chicago Convention and UNCLOS III in a similar
but not necessarily identical manner. 45
Under UNCLOS III, foreign vessels enjoy the right of innocent
passage navigation through the territorial waters of a state, 46 sub-
ject only to customs, police, health, and safety regulations of the ter-
ritorial state.147 However, passage of foreign aircraft through the air-
space above these same territorial waters is not permitted under
UNCLOS III or the Chicago Convention. 4 This limitation is moti-
vated by the inherent political, military, and security implications of
air travel. 4 9 UNCLOS III specifically recognizes exclusive state sov-
ereignty and control over the airspace overlying both its land terri-
tory and territorial sea waters.150 Similarly, article 1 of the Chicago
140. "Internal waters" generally refers to river inlets, bays, and other waters on
the landward side of the territorial sea (e.g., lakes, canals, and rivers). See UNCLOS III,
supra note 11, arts. 8-10.
141. See supra note 84.
142. The "contiguous zone" is a zone of the high seas contiguous to and not ex-
tending beyond 12 miles from the "territorial sea" of a coastal state, and is subject to
coastal state jurisdiction in matters concerning customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations. See UNCLOS III, supra note 11, pt. II.
143. The economic exploitation zone extends contiguous from the territorial waters
seaward to 200 nautical miles. See UNCLOS III, supra note 11, pt. V (1982).
144. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, pt. VII (1982).
145. In the Chicago Convention, "territory" seems to include both land territory as
well as territorial seas (as defined within UNCLOS III), while "high seas" refers to the
waters beyond the territorial sea limit. The EEZ is not specifically mentioned in the
Chicago Convention.
146. Article 18 of UNCLOS III defines innocent passage as "(a) traversing that
sea with entering the internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside
internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead
or port facility." It requires passage to be "continuous and expeditious," but to include
stopping and anchoring when incidental to ordinary navigation or "as rendered necessary
by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships
or aircraft in danger or distress." UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 18.
147. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 21.
148. Cooper, Space Above the Seas, JAG JOURNAL 8, 31 (Feb. 1959), reprinted
in, J. COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, at 200 (Vlasic ed. 1978).
149. See 0. Lissitzyn, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL POLICY,
STUDIES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, at 403 (No. 3, 1942).
150. Most States claim sovereignty over territorial seas which extend out to 12
miles beyond their coastline.
Convention recognizes each state's exclusive control of the airspace
overlying its "territory." ' The use of "territory" in this context
contemplates both land territory and the territorial sea.152 It is this
sovereignty, recognized under both UNCLOS III and the Chicago
Convention, which the Soviets asserted in the destruction of KAL
007.
It is universally recognized that each state has the right to exer-
cise its sovereign power within the borders of its land and the air-
space overlying its land and territorial sea. In the case of regulating
the airspace above EEZ waters, however, the dividing line apportion-
ing jurisdiction between the state and ICAO is ambiguous. 153 Inter-
national air routes, such as "Red 20,'1 54 the intended route of KAL
007, customarily pass through the airspace overlying EEZs, usually
without incident. These air routes have been widely recognized by
ICAO and its contracting states.1 55 Thus, present customary usage
treats the airspace above EEZs as it does airspace above the high
seas for the purpose of aircraft overflight, subject to limitations im-
posed by states designed only to protect their exploitation interests in
and below EEZ waters in accordance with UNCLOS 111.156 While
the passage of aircraft through the airspace overlying EEZs is recog-
15 1. Article I of the Chicago Convention states: "The contracting States recognize
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its terri-
tory." Article 2 states: "For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall
be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sover-
eignty, suzerainty, protections or mandate of such State."
152. See generally J. COOPER, supra note 148, at 194. This use of "territory" does
not, however, seem to contemplate exclusive state jurisdiction over the airspace above a
state's claimed EEZ. Id. See also infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
153. J. COOPER, supra note 148, at 195.
154. The flight track assigned to KAL 007 is called Red 20 (R20), one of five
tracks across the north Pacific used by an average of 100 planes a day in both directions.
Although Red 20 is the northern-most of these five routes and passes within fifty miles of
the Soviet-occupied Kuril Islands, it is the favored great circle route between Japan and
Anchorage. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) charts contain the following warn-
ing: "WARNING, Aircraft infringing upon Non-Free Flying Territory may be fired
upon without warning." Likewise, Jeppesen charts, those often used in the United States
and other countries, state: "Warning, Pilots flying northern routes between North Routes
and Japan avoid approaching or overflying Soviet controlled territory, specifically the
Kuril Islands." See Kennelly, supra note 26, at 15, 16.
155. During a meeting convened in Montreal on November 12-13, 1981, the
U.S.S.R. acknowledged R20 and agreed to "provide separation, in accordance with ap-
plicable ICAO provisions, between aircraft under their control and the airspace to be
protected in respect to proposed route R20, i.e., the airspace bounded by a line 50 [nauti-
cal miles] north of the route center." In doing so, the U.S.S.R. acknowledged not only
the existence of Red 20 but also the "relatively less precise nature of navigation used on
long, overwater flights." FAA Administrator Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Mon-
treal, Sept. 15, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 19.
156. Under UNCLOS III, coastal states may regulate overflight of their EEZ only
with respect to their exclusive jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations, structures,
and other activities aimed at the economic exploitation of the zone, scientific research,
and preservation of the marine environment. N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 137.
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nized both in custom and by implication in the Chicago Conven-
tion, 57 neither the coastal state nor ICAO can claim exclusive juris-
diction in this airspace.
Intrusion
Having recognized the exclusive sovereignty of a state over its
land territory and territorial waters, the Chicago Convention ad-
dresses aerial intrusion over these areas (non-consensual overflight).
Overflight of a state's sovereign airspace, by aircraft of foreign states
which do not otherwise enjoy territorial overflight privileges,58 vio-
lates the sovereignty principles proclaimed in article 1 of the Chi-
cago Convention, and is subject to ICAO rules regarding unautho-
rized overflight." 9 Aircraft of states which do enjoy territorial
overflight privileges might still "intrude" into airspace in violation of
the Chicago Convention by overflying state-designated prohibited ar-
eas.160 Even had there been a bilateral agreement between the Ko-
rean and Soviet governments exchanging routine overflight privi-
leges, KAL 007 had overflown sensitive military areas.' 6 ' These
areas were most certainly the subject contemplated by ICAO in pro-
viding for state designation of prohibited areas. Overflight of such
prohibited areas by any foreign aircraft, privileged or not, would
constitute an intrusion violation under the Chicago Convention.
157. The Chicago Convention recognizes innocent passage over the "high seas."
Arguably, it contemplates those waters which extend beyond the territorial sea, including
the EEZ and contiguous zone.
158. Overflight privileges may be the result of specifically negotiated bilateral
agreements between states. See, e.g., Civil air transport agreement with exchange of
notes, November 4, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 6135, 675 U.N.T.S. 3; Arrange-
ment relating to the inauguration of air service between New York and Moscow, July 8,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 6020, T.I.A.S. No. 6560, 702 U.N.T.S. 392; Protocol on questions relat-
ing to the expansion of air services under the civil air transport agreement of November
4, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 6135, with agreed services and Annex, 24 U.S.T.
1506, T.I.A.S. No. 7658. However, overflight privileges are more frequently exchanged
among ICAO members by means of a state's ratification of either the International Air
Services Transit Agreement or the International Air Transport Agreement, both of
which were adopted in Chicago on December 7, 1944, supplemental to the Chicago Con-
vention itself. International Air Services Transit Agreement, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. 487, 3
Bevans 916; International Transit Service Agreement, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. 488.
159. Chicago Convention, supra note 12.
160. Article 9 of the Chicago Convention provides for the designation of prohibited
areas for reasons of military necessity or public safety, applicable to all states or a non-
discriminatory basis, and of reasonable extent and location so as not to unnecessarily
interfere with air navigation. Thus, aircarft from states, which by special agreement,
have territorial overflight privileges, are nonetheless denied overflight of these prohibited
areas.
161. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Aerial intrusions may be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary in-
trusions might be motivated to accomplish numerous objectives such
as spying'62 (as was alleged by the Soviets in the KAL 007 inci-
dent)6 3 or terrorism.8 Involuntary intrusions can result from atmo-
spheric conditions, mechanical malfunction, or inflight emergencies
which require immediate landing.6 5
Non-consensual overflight of a state's territory has an impact on
both the safety of the aircraft and its passengers, as well as on the
security of the overflown state.16 Such unauthorized overflights are
the subject of regulation in a number of provisions within the Chi-
cago Convention. 6 7 For example, article 3, paragraph (d), declares
that the national regulation of state aircraft shall have due regard
for navigational safety of all civil aircraft within the state's terri-
tory. 168 Article 25 requires member states to provide all measures of
assistance to aircraft in distress. Article 26 provides for inquiries fol-
lowing accidents or incidents and requires investigation, coordinated
between representatives of the overflown state and representatives of
the state to whom an aircraft in distress belongs.169 Taken together,
these articles, in effect, limit the remedies available to contracting
states in cases of aerial intrusion. 17 0 The scope of available remedies,
although undefined, clearly stops short of armed conflict during
times of peace.' 7 ' This is in accord with the general principles of
peace and safety discussed in the Chicago Convention, UNCLOS
III, and the UN Charter. 7 2
The Use of Weapons Against Civil Aircraft - Amendment
(Article 3 bis) to the Chicago Convention
The forcing down of commercial aircraft, which because of atmo-
spheric or uncontrollable technical reasons penetrate sovereign air-
162. Kennelly, supra note 26, at 1.
163. See N. MATrE, supra note 78, at 175.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. These were the two predominant issues presented by the opposing sides in the
KAL 007 incident. Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention addresses "Security - Protection
of International Civil Aviation Against Unlawful Intervention."
167. N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 176.
168. Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 3, para. (d). See also N. MATTE,
supra note 78, at 176.
169. Chicago Convention, supra note 12, arts. 25 & 26.
170. In addition, Annex 2, appendix A, attachment A, section 8.1 specifically
states "Intercepting aircraft should refrain from the use of weapons in all cases of inter-
ception of civil aircraft." (emphasis added) The Annexes to the Chicago Convention are
not generally ratified. Rather, they serve as supplemental regulations devised by ICAO,
and are thus advisory in nature. As such, they are not binding upon the states which
have otherwise ratified the Chicago Convention. Id.
171. See infra notes 176 & 183 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 1, 136-138 and accompanying text.
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space without permission, had been condemned by ICAO prior to
the KAL 007 incident.1 73 On June 5, 1973, ICAO requested con-
tracting states to avoid intercepting civil aircraft unless necessary as
a last resort, and then, by using only the procedures and signals
found in Annex 2 of ICAO regulations. 17 4 At the same time, ICAO
specified that intercepted aircraft must follow the instructions of the
intercepting aircraft and, if possible, advise the controlling Air Traf-
fic Service. 17 5 ICAO further specified that the "intercepting aircraft
should refrain from the use of weapons in all cases of interception of
civil aircraft. 17 6 Based on these recommended practices which were
in effect at the time of the incident, states were hard pressed to jus-
tify the use of destructive force against any intruding civil
aircraft. 177
In September 1983 the ICAO Council held an Extraordinary Ses-
sion to consider the KAL 007 incident, and to consider an amend-
ment to the Chicago Convention which would require states to ab-
stain from the use of force against civil aircraft, subject only to the
provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter regarding the
individual or collective right of self-defense by states.7 8 This meet-
ing was the impetus behind the 25th Extraordinary Session of the
ICAO Assembly on May 10, 1984, where an amendment was
adopted to article 3 of the Chicago Convention. 17 9 The key provision
of article 3 bis is found in the first sentence of paragraph (a), which
states: "The contracting States recognize that every State must re-
frain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board
and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered." 180 Paragraph
(b), however, recognizes that all states are "entitled to require the
landing . . . of a civil aircraft flying above its territory without au-
thority or if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being
173. N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 176. This was in response to the Libyan Air
Lines incident on February 21, 1973, which ended in 108 deaths. Id.
174. ICAO Doc. 9097-C/1016; See also Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention, 6th
edition, September 1970.
175. Id.
176. See Chicago Convention, supra note 12, supplement A (emphasis added).
177. This may be the strongest factor causing the Soviets to maintain their posi-
tion that KAL 007 was on an intelligence flight directed by the United States. See gener-
ally supra notes 39 & 40, and accompanying text.
178. The Use of Weapons against Civil Aircraft - Amendment (Article 3 bis) to
the Chicago Convention, AIR & SPACE LAW., Fall 1984, at 7 [hereinafter cited as The
Use of Weapons].
179. Id.
180. Id (emphasis added).
used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention
.... ,"181 Paragraph (c) requires aircraft to comply with an order to
land in conformity with paragraph (b), and paragraph (d) requires
contracting states to "take appropriate measures to prohibit the de-
liberate use of any civil aircraft registered in that State for any
purpose inconsistent with the aims of [the] Convention." 82
This amendment is an important first step in responding to the
KAL 007 incident in a way which recognizes the competing interests
of states' security and aircraft safety in international travel. That
which was formerly recommended non-binding policy is now binding
international law. However, the ICAO Assembly has failed to ad-
dress the overriding issue of enforcement.
Balancing Interests
By ratifying agreements such as UNCLOS III, the Chicago Con-
vention, and the UN Charter, states implicitly recognize their obli-
gation to respond to unauthorized overflight with measures short of
armed conflict.' 8 3 Involuntary intrusions due to environmental condi-
tions, navigation malfunctions, and other aircraft emergencies are
realities often beyond human control. 84 These situations are now ad-
dressed by viable procedures which promote rather than jeopardize
safety of flight. 8 5 While these procedures permit states to defend
themselves against deliberate intrusions which substantially threaten
national security, they prohibit the use of arms against unarmed civil
aircraft engaged in international travel. 86 Such use of arms under-
mines trust, reliance, and expectation - the very fabric of interna-
tional law. The Soviet's reluctance to modify their announced policy
to use force against intruding aircraft casts a shadow over the inter-
national agreements in which they participate.
UNCLOS III, like its predecessor treaties, recognizes the right of
innocent passage through the "territorial waters" of all states. Pas-
sage is "innocent" when it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal state.'87 Article 21 of UNCLOS III allows
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id.
183. N. MATTE, supra note 78, at 175, n.201.
184. Id.
185. See The Use of Weapons, supra note 178, at 7-9.
186. Id.
187. Under article 19 of UNCLOS III, innocent passage becomes "prejudicial"
when it entails (1) activities which use or threaten the use of force against the sovereign,
(2) exercises or practice with weapons of any kind, (3) intelligence gathering, (4) propa-
ganda dissemination, (5) launching or recovering aircraft (the right to innocent passage
overflight of the territorial sea of a state is not recognized), (6) the launching or recover-
ing of any military devices or commodities, currency, or persons, contrary to the customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws of the coastal state, (7) willful and serious pollution,
(8) fishing, (9) research or surveying, (10) meaconing or jamming, or any other activity
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states to enforce innocent passage, generally to protect their own in-
terests in the territorial sea. Article 25 permits the designation of
specified off-limit territorial sea areas when required to protect a
state's national security. Such areas are similar in nature to the
"prohibited areas provided for under the Chicago Convention."18
Thus, UNCLOS III, like the Chicago Convention, recognizes valid
economic and self-defense interests of coastal states.
Recognition of these interests is further reflected in the enforce-
ment provisions of UNCLOS III. Article 25 recognizes the power of
coastal states to enforce innocent passage limitations by taking "nec-
essary" measures.119 This logically implies the use of least necessary
measures. 190 In the case of warships, article 30 of UNCLOS III spe-
cifically provides that "[i]f any warship does not comply with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through
the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance there-
with which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave
the territorial sea immediately."119 In this context, the remedy of a
coastal state is limited to requiring a warship to leave, exerting the
least threatening method necessary to accomplish the offending
ship's exit. This was the provision relied upon by the Soviet Union
when its submarine ran aground in Swedish territorial waters in
not having a direct bearing on passage. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 19 (Meaning
of innocent passage). Passage of submarines are not innocent unless accomplished on the
surface. Id. art. 20 (Submarines and underwater vehicles).
188. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 25. See also supra note 161 and accompa-
nying text.
189. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 25.
190. [F]or ... measures to be legitimate, they must be taken for an essen-
tially defensive and preventative purpose .... The use of force is justifiable
only by its being necessary. In its attempt at self-preservation the State should
be guided by the principles of good faith and the dictates of humanity. In partic-
ular, there should be nothing unreasonable or excessive going beyond the needs
of the case and out of all proportion to the injury which the State has first set
out to avert or redress.
B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962).
It is not hard to imagine a case in which the risk to the security of the territorial
State is so clear (a flight of three intercontinental bombers off course in the
airspace of another State with whom relations are tense) that almost immediate
destruction of the intruder aircraft could be justified under every standard of
law and humanity. Where the risk is not so clear, however, and perhaps in all
cases where the risk is only to intelligence security of the territorial State, it is
much harder to justify destruction of such aircraft in accordance to the same
standards of law and humanity.
Legal Issues, supra note 1, at 3.
191. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 30 (emphasis added).
1981.1 1 While article 30 applies only to warships, articles 26-28 pro-
vide for limited jurisdiction over other foreign ships, allowing for
seizure of ships to levy charges or exercise limited criminal or civil
jurisdiction. 1 3 However, an important limitation in implementing
such a seizure is the corresponding right of the flag state to a vessel
to post a bond or other financial security to obtain its release.19
Thus there exists a limited right of an intruded-upon state to use
least-necessary force to accomplish a legitimate seizure of a vessel or
to effect its exit from a state's territorial sea. 95
UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention closely parallel each
other in purpose. Each agreement recognizes rights of passage and
safety of ships and aircraft, respectively, during international travel.
Both promulgate measures which require enforcement without use of
arms. Each agreement demonstrates a concern for human life by
mandating search and rescue assistance to vessels and aircraft in dis-
tress. 96 The right of states to assert sovereign power in recognized
situations is overshadowed by the Chicago Convention, UNCLOS
III, and UN Charter requirements which call for the use of peaceful
means to settle all disputes. 9 7 However, the permissible use of
"least-threatening" force under UNCLOS III against ships in viola-
tion of international law during innocent passage has no counterpart
in aviation. It is difficult to envision the use of any measure of force
against an airborne aircraft which could not potentially destroy the
aircraft or threaten the lives of persons on board. Yet the need re-
mains for an enforcement scheme, short of armed response, which
finds an appropriate balance between the competing interests of
states' security and safety of flight.
The Illusory Nature of Sanctions
Some scholars assert that international law is non-existent. This
assertion derives from a perceived inability, short of armed conflict,
to enforce the agreements, customs, and moral guidelines which exist
among nations. 98 Consensus, agreement, and consent are, in effect,
the substance of international law. 9 9 Enforcement is generally ac-
complished through the pressures of world opinion, exchange of mu-
192. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
193. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 30 (Non-compliance by warships with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State).
194. See id. art. 292 (Prompt release of vessels and crew).
195. See id. art. 25 (Aircraft in distress).
196. See id. art. 98 (Duty to render assistance); Chicago Convention, supra note
12, art. 25.
197. Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 1; UNCLOS III, supra note 11, Pre-
amble; U.N. CHARTER, art. 1.
198. V. ROLLO, supra note 23, at 269.
199. Id.
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tual benefits, economic sanctions, and the deterrence posed by the
potential for armed conflict.2 00 The KAL 007 incident serves as a
vivid example of the illusory nature of these enforcement mecha-
nisms. Despite unprecedented expressions of outrage throughout the
world, and temporary termination of reciprocal landing rights by
many nations, the Soviets have not altered their announced policy to
prevent the unauthorized overflight of their territory by unmitigated
use of armed force.20 1
Use of armed force against the Soviets in retaliation for their ac-
tion against KAL 007 might strengthen Soviet resolve to defend the
integrity of its borders against future intrusion by military and civil-
ian aircraft. Further, such use of force would clearly be as violative
of international law as was the Soviet's action against KAL 007.202
Moreover, as a practical matter, armed conflict between the United
States and the USSR, in the midst of continuing nuclear build-up
and the recent impasse in bilateral nuclear arms reduction, seems at
the very least imprudent and potentially devastating. Such inherent
weaknesses in resorting to the use of armed conflict to enforce inter-
national law render it intuitively untenable and a potentially self-
defeating undertaking.
Likewise, economic sanctions are most often not without substan-
tial detriment to the imposing party. For example, the United States
tourist industry allegedly will have lost close to $500 million as a
result of the revocation by the United States of reciprocal landing
rights previously held by the Soviet airline Aeroflot.20 3 This United
States boycott continues at the expense of the tourist and airline in-
dustries. The termination of flights to the Soviet Union by other na-
tions in response to the KAL 007 incident was only temporary, ar-
guably to minimize the detrimental economic impact on affected
airlines, passengers, and national economies in general.
Economic sanctions, imposed independently, have been effective
only as token expressions of protest. An organized world-wide boy-
cott would prove more effective. A mechanism for implementation of
such a boycott against an airline registered in a contracting state
currently exists. Article 87 of the Chicago Convention provides:
"Each contracting State undertakes not to allow the operation of an
200. Id.
201. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
202. U.S. actions estimated to cost Soviets $1.5-2 Million Annually, supra note
66, at 18, 19.
203. In response to the imposition of maritial law in Poland, the U.S. suspended its
treaty with the USSR exchanging landing rights in December, 1982. See supra note 66.
airline of a contracting State through the airspace above its territory
if the Council (ICAO) has decided that the airline concerned is not
conforming to the final decision rendered in accordance with the pre-
vious articles. 20 4
In the KAL incident, this sanction, although in spirit appropri-
ately enforceable against the USSR, technically fails to qualify for
application. It was the military arm of the Soviet government, rather
than a Soviet commercial airline (e.g., Aeroflot), which had violated
international law. The Soviet government's military action and sub-
sequent refusal to allow international participation in search and res-
cue efforts, to make compensation, or to change its policy has been
addressed by ICAO only by a resolution condemning Soviet action in
this incident.205 This appears to be the limit of action presently au-
thorized under the Chicago Convention against states themselves.
ENFORCEMENT: PROPOSED CHANGES
Enforcement of the international law contained within UNCLOS
III and the Chicago Convention depends upon voluntary compliance
by each contracting state. Both UNCLOS III and the Chicago Con-
vention provide numerous alternatives to effect peaceful resolution of
disputes between party states. States are expected to choose among
enumerated or other mutually agreeable methods.20 6 Refusal to sub-
mit to jurisdiction under one of these methods, however, remains an
option often used with limited consequence.207
204. Chicago Convention, supra note 11, art. 87.
205. ICAO Council Resolution, Sept. 16, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL, Oct.
1983, at 20.
206. Part XV of UNCLOS III addresses settlement of disputes. Generally, it al-
lows contracting states to settle their disputes using any mutually agreeable means, in-
cluding negotiations, arbitration, or submission to various international tribunals for ad-
judication. Similarly, Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention addresses disputes and
defaults. Articles 87 and 88 prescribe penalties for nonconformity by airlines and states,
respectively. Under the Chicago Convention, the penalty for a non-conforming airline is
essentially an economic sanction, i.e., suspension of its international operating privileges.
207. Under the Chicago Convention, the penalty for nonconforming states is lim-
ited to the suspension of that state's voting privileges in the ICAO Assembly. Many
states ratify treaties with reservation, taking exception to those provisions requiring sub-
mission to the jurisdiction of international tribunals or binding arbitration for the resolu-
tion of disputes. For example, under the multilateral treaty entitled "Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) Agreement," the USSR, in
its ratification notice, states:
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider
itself bound by the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 14, which provide that
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention shall be
submitted to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice at the request
of one of the Parties to the dispute.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act Against the Safety of Civil Aircraft,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-
public ratified this treaty with the same exception and the Romanian Soviet Socialist
Republic ratified it with a similar optional consent declaration. Id. No other signatories
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The Paris Convention provided for the deposit of security funds
with host nations to substitute for the seizure of an aircraft held pur-
suant to a claim of design or mechanical patent infringement. °0 In
practice, when a host country seized an aircraft under a claim of
patent infringement, the aircraft's owner or state of registry could
post a bond, in lieu of seizure, to protect the manufacturer's techno-
logical patent integrity. When the Paris Convention was replaced by
the Chicago Convention in 1944, article 27 of the Chicago Conven-
tion expressly prohibited the seizure of aircraft to enforce patent in-
fringement claims, consequently eliminating the need for the security
deposit procedure. However, a remaining vestige of this procedure is
found in article 292 of UNCLOS III, which provides for the ex-
change of security funds for seized vessels and crewmembers.20 9
Use of security deposits in lieu of aircraft under the Paris Conven-
tion was an effective way to protect patent interests in aircraft tech-
to this Convention have taken issue with these partial ratifications. However, regarding
the Convention on the International Recognition of the Rights in Aircraft, in response to
reservations made by Mexico in its ratification of the treaty, the United States and the
Netherlands have stated that they are "unable to accept these reservations" and declare
that they do not regard the Convention as in force between Mexico and their govern-
ments. Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, June 19, 1948,
4 U.S.T. 1830, T.I.A.S. No. 2847, 310 U.N.T.S. 151. However, the import of this con-
flict seems minimal, as U.S.- and Mexican-registered privately owned and commercial
aircraft exercise reciprocal landing privileges. See generally 9 Whiteman's Digest 340,
41 (1973) (Incidents involving the wrongful shooting down of U.S. military aircraft
which were not within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
208. Article 18 of the Paris Convention stated:
Every aircraft passing through the territory of a contracting State, including
landing and stoppages reasonably necessary for the purpose of such transit, shall
be exempt from any seizure on the ground of infringement of patent, design or
model, subject to the deposit of security the amount of which in default of ami-
cable agreement shall be fixed with the least possible delay by the competent
authority of the place seized.
Early plane manufacturers jealously guarded their prototypes; the science of aviation was
so new that each improvement in design gave a manufacturer a great advantage. V.
ROLLO, supra note 23, at 286.
209. UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 292 (Prompt release of vessels & crews),
provides that:
Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of
another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied
with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its
crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security . . .
[u]pon the posting of [a] bond or other financial security determined by the
court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State shall comply promptly
with the decision of the court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or
its crew.
UNCLOS III, supra note 11, art. 292. See also supra notes 185-86 and accompanying
text.
nology. Under UNCLOS III, similar use of the security deposit pro-
tects the right asserted by offended states as well as the rights of
offending vessel owners and their crewmembers. With the political,
religious, and ideological differences which exist among the nations
of the world, there is great potential for conflicts which jeopardize
life and property, as evidenced by the KAL 007 incident. Property is
replaceable but costly, and human life can be neither replaced nor
adequately compensated for. These interests deserve at least as much
protection in the context of international civil aviation law as that
afforded vessels at sea under UNCLOS III.
Enforcement of UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention would
be greatly enhanced by forced jurisdictional submission. However, as
discussed above,210 such submission has been essentially voluntary
unless enforced by the use of arms.
Economic success is essential to each state's existence and is a
common thread among all states. Herein lies the most viable motiva-
tion for jurisdictional submission by party States. Two proposals, one
offensive in nature, the other defensive, would increase this
motivation.
Offensively, the Chicago Convention should be amended to give
ICAO economic sanction power against commercial airlines whose
aircraft intrude upon the airspace of foreign states by unauthorized
overflight. Two offensive schemes are suggested. First, a substantial
predetermined fine, payable to an offended state, should be imposed
by ICAO against an offending airline. Such a fine would 1) motivate
airlines to exercise an increased level of care in international naviga-
tion, and 2) motivate offended states to exercise an increased level of
care in accurately identifying intruding aircraft for the purpose of
reporting violations to ICAO for adjudication and monetary compen-
sation. A logical extension of this monetary fine scheme would pro-
vide for the posting of a security deposit to affect the release of an
aircraft which is intercepted and required to land in an offended
state's territory. Aircrew who fail to comply with orders to land by
intercepting state aircraft should give rise to airline liability for an
additional fine. This would further motivate states to utilize pre-
scribed intercept procedures to identify intruding aircraft in lieu of
the use of armed response, as well as motivate airlines to cooperate
with interception and seizure procedures when utilized by offended
states.
Jurisdiction without the power to enforce it is a fiction. Existing
boycott procedures found in article 87 of the Chicago Convention
gives ICAO power to enforce such a monetary fine against offending
airlines.
210. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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Defensively, amendment of the Chicago Convention expanding the
boycott power of ICAO under article 87 for use against states who
resort to the use of unjustified armed force is appropriate and neces-
sary to complete the enforcement formula. This will help displace
much of the burden inherent in "economic sanctions" borne by indi-
vidual governments, groups, and citizens. This economic sanction.
might be temporary in duration, or require either monetary settle-
ment or the posting of a security bond in lieu of a monetary settle-
ment, pending adjudication in an acceptable international law tribu-
nal. This would motivate offended states to limit their use of force to
situations of bona fide self-defense.
Investigatory access is a necessary tool in the adjudication of con-
flicts which give rise to ICAO's exercise of authority. 1 The pro-
posed enforcement schemes must also be implemented against states
or airlines who deny access for investigation of aircraft accidents or
of ICAO violations.
CONCLUSION
More than 750 million passengers traveled to international desti-
nations in 1982.212 Each of the 151 members of ICAO have agreed
to respect certain principles and obligations, as codified in the Chi-
cago Convention and its annexes, to facilitate this travel. The Soviet
Union must, as an ICAO member, adhere to these principles and
obligations on a consistent basis. Soviet action in the KAL 007 inci-
dent is clearly inimical to the letter and spirit of the Chicago Con-
vention. Having just recently ratified UNCLOS III, the Soviet
Union, by its action against KAL 007, has wasted little time in send-
ing a clear message to the rest of the world that it cannot be ex-
pected to be held bound by its international agreements. This high-
lights the problem of enforcing international law, specifically the
Chicago Convention and its maritime analogue, UNCLOS III. Both
the Chicago Convention and UNCLOS III require amendment, to
fortify jurisdiction over the international highways of travel found on
the ocean's surface and in the airspace above it, and to expand the
scope of remedies available for misuse of these media of interna-
211. "Verification" has been a key issue in the recent nuclear and space arms-
control negotiations between the United States and U.S.S.R. While disagreeing on imple-
mentation, each side recognizes the importance of verification access to ensure mutual
compliance with nuclear weapon inventory limitations. See generally, W. POTrER, VER-
IFICATION AND SALT: THE CHALLENGE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION (1980).
212. FAA Administrator Helm's Statement, ICAO Council, Montreal, Sept. 15,
1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1983, at 20.
tional travel. While intrusion of the territorial airspace of another
state clearly violates the sovereignty principles proclaimed in both
UNCLOS III and the Chicago Convention, international law has
dedicated itself to peaceful means for the resolution of such viola-
tions. By their actions, the Soviets have invited a reevaluation of the
viability of both of these agreements. On September 16, 1983, the
ICAO Council passed a resolution213 calling for a full investigation
and review of the provisions of the Chicago Convention, its annexes,
and other related documents, to consider possible amendments to
prevent a recurrence of this tragic incident.214 This resulted in an
amendment to the Chicago Convention which codified existing policy
proscribing the use of armed force against civil aircraft.215
To date, the Soviet Union has made no reparations, nor altered its
announced policy to shoot down commercial aircraft which might
unintentionally enter Soviet airspace. Until the Soviets recommit
themselves to existing international law under UNCLOS III and the
Chicago Convention, these agreements will fail in much of their
peace-promoting mission.
Sanctions imposed by individual governments and organizations
have been individually burdensome, temporary in nature, and inef-
fective. This reflects the exploitable nature of international law
which is inherently limited by voluntarily participation of states.
Economic motivation is one which cuts across the ideological dif-
ferences which exist in the world. Predetermined economic conse-
quence on a much larger scale is required to motivate states to com-
ply with international law and to resolve the stalemate between the
policy of the Soviets and that of the rest of the world regarding in-
ternational civil aviation.
The monetary fine and security deposit procedures suggested in
this Comment would motivate airlines to exercise greater care in in-
ternational navigation, and cooperate in the event of interception and
seizure of the aircraft. ICAO's power to implement the boycott pro-
cedure against offending airlines is necessary to enforce the fine sys-
tem and to increase these motivations. As beneficiaries of the mone-
tary fine and security deposit, offended states would be motivated to
utilize prescribed peaceful methods rather than armed destructive
response in cases of non-threatening intrusion. These offensive mech-
anisms provide economic incentive in favor of offended states, rather
than punitive action against them, and encourages adherence to in-
213. The Resolution was passed by a vote of 26 to 2; the
USSR and Czechoslovakia voted against it. Algeria, China, and India abstained, and
Iraq and Lebanon were absent.
214. ICAO Council Resolution, Sept. 16, 1983, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL, Oct.
1983, at 20.
215. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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ternational law.
The proposed expansion of article 87 of the Chicago Convention
also provides for a boycott imposed by ICAO against states who fail
to adhere to either the provisions of the Convention or other supple-
mental regulations passed by ICAO. This defensive scheme is appro-
priately invoked in cases similar to the KAL 007 incident where use
of armed force to destroy civil aircraft is favored over adherence to
prescribed intercept procedures.
Enforceability is a problem which demands immediate attention.
It is unacceptable to await repetition of the KAL 007 incident to
draw international support for amendment to the Chicago Conven-
tion. Economic sanction is the only viable alternative to bring mean-
ingful enforceability into the international law forum. The future of
the Chicago Convention, UNCLOS III, and all international law,
depends upon effective enforcement schemes to bring full meaning
and life to international law.
JEFFREY D. LAVESON

